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Introduction
Consider a risk-averse individual with a riskless and a risky asset. The risky asset exposes the individual to nominal price risk. If, for example, the risky asset is a position in a foreign currency, nominal price risk takes the form of nominal exchange rate risk. When there is a forward market for the risky asset, price risk can be traded. Suppose that the individual maximizes expected utility of nominal wealth. Then, given an unbiased forward market, the individual will completely eliminate price risk as is well-known.
This paper addresses the following question: How is the optimal forward position a ected by the existence of a second, multiplicative risk that cannot be traded? This risk can be in ation risk, for example. The question is motivated by the fact that individuals are not primarily interested in nominal wealth perse but instead in consumption or real wealth. Nominal wealth is related to consumption by the prices of consumption goods. For simplicity, assume there is one composite consumption good. If its price is deterministic, the probability distribution of nominal wealth equals that of consumption. If, in contrast, the price of the consumption good is random, the individual is exposed to in ation risk. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the e ect of untradable in ation risk on the optimal forward position in a tradable risk. Thus, the paper contributes to the work on optimal decisions in incomplete nancial markets. In ation risk is assumed to be untradable. 1 In the presence of untradable in ation risk, the individual will generally take into account the joint stochastic behavior of the rate of in ation and the tradable risk when deciding on the optimal forward position in the tradable risk. For example, if the individual's nominal wealth is positively correlated with in ation, he expects to be richer in nominal terms when consumption goods are expensive and poorer when consumption goods are cheap. Consequently, consumption varies less than in the absence of in ation risk. Intuition suggests that this reduces the optimal forward position. However, it will be shown that this is not necessarily correct, depending on the joint distribution of the two risks.
In ation risk is incorporated in the model by de ning the individual's utility function over real wealth. This is in contrast to previous hedging models where utility is de ned over nominal wealth. 2 It will beshown in a two-date model that the optimal forward position is determined by (1) the joint distribution of the two risks, (2) the real risk premium in the forward market and (3) the level of relative r i s k a version (RRA). If untradable in ation risk is a monotone function of the tradable risk plus a noise term, the results are as follows: Full hedging of the tradable risk is not optimal if the forward market is unbiased. Firstly, correlation implies a non-zero real risk premium if the nominal risk premium in the forward market is zero. Thus, the individual speculates on the real risk premium a speculative position in the forward market will be optimal. Secondly, correlation allows for cross hedging. The forward market will be used to cross hedge the untradable risk a cross hedging position will be optimal. As will beshown, the speculative position and the cross hedging position have opposite signs. The level of RRA determines whether speculation or cross hedging is dominant in a nominally unbiased forward market. For stochastically independent risks, cross hedging is impossible. Thus, the untradable risk only a ects the extent of speculation. Under logarithmic utility, multiplicative untradable risk is ignored.
The classical hedging problem in which there is only a tradable risk has been analyzed by Danthine (1978) , Holthausen (1979) and others. More recent papers analyze the e ects of additional risks that are untradable. Benninga et al. (1985) and Adam-M uller (1997) consider the e ects of a second risk that is multiplicatively combined with only the tradable risk Adam-M uller (1993), and Franke et al. (1998) consider an independent, additive background risk in initial wealth. Cross hedging is discussed by Anderson and Danthine (1981) , Broll et al. (1995) , Broll and Wahl (1996) and others.
The rst to analyze optimal hedging in the presence of untradable ination risk were . They use a state-dependent preference model to analyze the optimal forward position under the assumption that there are only two realizations of the in ation rate. 3 They show that starting from deterministic in ation, untradable in ation risk does not a ect the sign of the open position in the tradable risk if marginal utility is state-independent. For state-dependent marginal utility, clear-cut results can only be derived under restricted conditions. In contrast to , this paper uses state-independent preferences but allows for any probability distribution of the in ation rate.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the analytical framework. Sections 3 to 5 analyze the optimal forward position under different sets of assumptions. Section 3 brie y addresses the logarithmic utility case without restricting the joint probability distribution of the two risks. Section 4 assumes stochastic independence but allows for any risk-averse utility function. In Section 5, both assumptions are relaxed. A numerical example is provided in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
Consider a two-date model where decisions are made at date 0 and uncertainty is resolved at date 1. The individual's initial endowment consists of q units of an asset whose pricep is risky, q > 0 a n d p > 0 almost surely 4 . Thẽ p-risk is called nominal price risk. In addition, the individual is endowed with a deterministic amount of nominal wealth due at date 1, denoted a, a 0. There exists a competitive forward market for the risky asset. Hence, thep-risk is tradable. f is the date 0 forward price for delivery of one unit of the risky asset at date 1. a, f, and q are exogeneously given. F is the quantity of the risky asset sold forward. Nominal wealthñ at date 1 is given byñ = a + p q + F (f ;p) : (1) Nominal wealth will becompletely consumed at date 1. Therefore, the individual is not interested in nominal but in real wealth. Real wealth is the product of nominal wealth and the purchasing power indexz, z 0 almost surely. The individual consumes a competitively traded composite consumption good with nominal price 1=z at date 1. Without loss of generality, we assume Ez = 1 such thatz represents unexpected in ation. The randomness ofz is called in ation risk. We assume that in ation risk cannot betraded. Thus,z is a multiplicative background risk that applies to the individual's entire nominal wealth. The individual is jointly exposed to nominal price risk and in ation risk. The joint distribution ofp andz is known to the individual. Real wealthr at date 1 i s g i v en bỹ r =zñ =z a + f q + ( F ; q)(f ;p) : (2) 4 Random variables have a tilde, their realizations do not.
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At date 0, the individual decides on F . He is assumed to maximize a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U de ned over real wealthr which is at least twice continuously di erentiable and strictly concave. Thus, the individual is risk-averse 5 . The optimization problem is
subject to equation (2) . Since the maximand is strictly concave i n F , the optimal value F opt is the unique solution of the rst-order condition
We assume U 0 (r) ! 1 for r ! 0 in order to preclude insolvency or starvation. Notice that r ! 0 is equivalent to n ! 0 since z > 0. Thus, we always have n > 0.
Equation (2) indicates that the decision problem is equivalent to choosing a nominal speculative position (F ; q) given a deterministic nominal endowment of (a + f q ). Under full hedging, de ned as F = q, allp-risk is eliminated and nominal wealth is risk-free. It is useful to repeat some commonly used de nitions concerning the forward market and the forward position. The nominal risk premium in the forward market is E f ;p]. If it is zero not zero], the forward market is said to benominally unbiased nominally biased]. If the forward price is smaller higher] than the spot price expected for date 1, the forward market is said to exhibit backwardation contango]. The real risk premium is E z(f ;p)]. The forward market is said to be unbiased biased] in real terms if E z(f ;p)] = Holthausen, 1979) . It is counterintuitive that the optimal forward position is independent from in ation risk even if price and in ation risk are strongly correlated and in ation variability i s h i g h . Therefore, logarithmic utility will be replaced by more general preferences in the following. Proof: All proofs are given in the Appendix.
Under independence, forward contracts only allow for hedging the tradable risk. The relation between the optimal forward position F opt and the initial exposure q only depends on the relation between the forward price and the expected spot price. Cross hedging in ation risk is impossible since there is no systematic relation betweenp andz. If the real risk premium is zero, the individual attempts to minimize real risk. Given stochastic independence, this implies a full hedge in the tradable risk. In a nominally biased forward market, the real risk premium di ers from zero. Thus, a speculative position is optimal.
The optimal forward position can be decomposed as F opt = F n + F s . F n is a pure hedging component which completely eliminates nominal price risk from nominal wealth. Thus, we always have F n = q. The speculative component F s has the same sign as the nominal and the real risk premium.
Theorem 1 illustrates the well-known result that any risk averter takes a risky position when there is a non-zero risk premium (Arrow, 1965, p. 39 ). This result still holds for the maximization of expected utility o f r e a l w ealth if both risks are independent. However, it is important to note that the optimal level F opt is a ected by in ation risk whenever F opt 6 = q.
By de nition, in ation risk applies multiplicatively to the entire nominal wealth. If independent untradable in ation risk is replaced by an additive background risk that is both independent and untradable, the qualitative statement of Theorem 1 still holds (Adam-M uller, 1993 . But if in ation risk is replaced by another independent and untradable multiplicative risk that only applies topq, Theorem 1 no longer holds. In that case, the forward position also depends on the individual's prudence in the sense of Kimball (1990) Under these assumptions, we have two e ects. The rst is speculation, the second is cross hedging. Let us look at speculation rst. The real risk premium is E z(f ;p)] = EzE f ;p] ; cov( p h( p)). This shows that a nominally unbiased forward market is biased in real terms. Any position in a nominally unbiased forward market changes expected real wealth while leaving expected nominal wealth unchanged. The existence of a real risk premium provides an incentive for speculation. Hence, there will be a speculative position. Second, correlation between in ation risk and nominal price risk allows the individual to cross hedge untradable in ation risk. Thus, there will be a cross hedging position as well.
Given these two e ects, Theorem 2 characterizes the optimal forward position relative to the initial exposure given a nominally unbiased forward market.
Theorem Since correlation betweenp andz allows one to indirectly hedge the untradable risk, there is a cross hedging component, denoted by F c . Cross hedging reduces real wealth risk by buying nominal wealth for states with low purchasing power against nominal wealth in states with high purchasing power as compared to the case of independent risks. Thus, for negatively correlatedp andz, the cross hedging component F c is negative since this provides higher nominal wealth in states with low purchasing power. Analogously, we have F c > 0 for cov( p z) > 0. This is in line with a result from Broll and Wahl (1996) It is important to note that the components of the optimal forward position are not independent. For example, the cross hedging component F c not only deals with in ation risk arising from the initial position in the risky asset and the nominally risk-free part of the endowment but also with in ation risk arising from expected nominal wealth associated with a speculative position.
The following Corollary extends the results of Theorem 2 by a l l o wing the forward market to be nominally biased. This increases the motivation to speculate. The real risk premium is given by E z(f ;p)] = EzE f ;p];cov( p h( p)). Theorem 2 describes the optimal forward position for EzE f ;p] = 0. In the Corollary, we enlarge the real risk premium by allowing for a non-zero nominal risk premium while holding its sign constant. Hence, the speculative component grows but leaves the sign of (F opt ; q) unchanged as compared to a nominally unbiased forward market.
As Theorem 2 and the Corollary show, the optimal forward position F opt relative to the initial exposure q crucially depends on whether RRA is above one or not. Numerous attempts have been made to empirically investigate the level of constant RRA (CRRA). Evidence is mixed but tends to suggest that CRRA is above one.
An example
The purpose of this example is to illustrate Theorem 2. It is based on the same assumptions except for the (slightly) stronger assumption of CRRA given by power utility U(r) = r = . Risk aversion implies < 1 CRRA equals (1 ; ), relative prudence amounts to (2 ; ) > 0. We assumez = + = p + ". Three distributions of real wealth are compared: The rst distribution refers to full hedging, F = q, and will be used as a benchmark. The sec- ond is the distribution of real wealth given an optimal forward position and CRRA = 1:5, the third is optimal if CRRA = 0:5. The initial position is a = 1000 and q = 50. There are four possible states at date 1 with equal probability. For" as well as forp, two realizations are possible. In states 1 and 2, p = 0 :5 in states 3 and 4, p = 1 :5. In states 1 and 3, " =", in states 2 and 4, " = ;". Thus, Ep = 1 and E" = 0 . Nominal unbiasedness requires f = 1. An increase in" is a mean preserving spread for" and, thus, forz. We set = 0 :24. = 0 :68 ensures Ez = 1 . The rst column of Table 1 shows". A higher" implies a higher"-risk. Hence, three wealth distributions are compared for six di erent scenarios.
The marginal distribution ofp is always the same. The correlation coefcient ( p z) is given in the second column. The third column denotes the underlying assumptions about full hedging or optimal hedging assuming CRRA = 1:5 or CRRA = 0:5, respectively. The position relative to the initial endowment is given in the fourth column. In the remaining columns, each distribution of real wealth is characterized by its mean Er, its standard deviation (r) and the smallest and highest realization of real wealth, min(r) and max(r).
In a nominally unbiased forward market, Eñ is a constant. In the rst scenario where" is zero, tradable and untradable risks are perfectly negatively correlated. This is the case of general in ation. For an underhedging position of (F ; q) = ;336, real wealth risk is a constant.
If cross hedging were the only objective, this position would be optimal. However, completely eliminating risk is suboptimal since there is a positive real risk premium. Table 1 shows that the extent of speculation signi cantly di ers between the two levels of CRRA.
In contrast to what might h a ve been expected, the optimal open position increases as" becomes more volatile. To see why, consider CRRA = 1:5 where cross hedging is the dominant objective. Since correlation betweenp andz decreases as" increases, cross hedging becomes less e ective. Hence the individual is less prepared to bear additional risks by taking a speculative position. Consequently, (F ; q) < 0 is reduced. The reduction of F provides additional real wealth in states where real wealth is very low. Therefore, 10 It follows directly from Section 3 that full hedging is optimal for CRRA = 1. 14 this behavior is well in line with the notion of prudence 11 . Now, consider C R R A = 0 :5. The fact that cross hedging is less e ective implies that even less value is set on this already minor objective. Speculation plays an even more dominant role despite the fact that the real risk premium is constant.
(F ; q) > 0 i s further increased.
A detailed analysis of the last three columns of Table 1 is left to the reader.
Conclusion
This paper incorporates untradable in ation risk into the problem of hedging a tradable risk, e.g., price risk, using forward contracts. In ation risk applies multiplicatively to the entire nominal wealth. Since the decision maker maximizes expected utility o f r e a l w ealth, untradable in ation risk a ects his behavior in the forward market except for logarithmic utility. In the case of stochastically independent price and in ation risk, the nominal and the real risk premium are of the same sign. Hence the latter only has a quantitative e ect on the optimal forward position: well-known results on optimal hedging remain valid. In the case of stochastically dependent price and in ation risk, results signi cantly di er. If untradable in ation risk is a monotone function of the tradable risk plus a noise term, the level of relative r i s k a version plays a crucial role for the optimal forward position. This becomes clear when the optimal forward position is broken down into a pure hedging component, a component arising from speculation on the real risk premium and a cross hedging component. The pure hedging component always mirrors the initial endowment and eliminates all tradable risk from nominal wealth. Speculation on the real risk premium and cross hedging are con icting goals. For relative risk aversion less than one, the motivation to speculate is stronger when the nominal risk premium is zero. For relative risk aversion above one, cross hedging considerations dominate the optimal forward position in a nominally unbiased forward market. In bothcases, full hedging is not optimal if the forward market is nominally unbiased since there is a real risk premium.
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